University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Law Faculty Publications

2018

The Lion, the Bat & the Thermostat: Metaphors on Consciousness
Brian L. Frye

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Repository Citation
Frye, Brian L., "The Lion, the Bat & the Thermostat: Metaphors on Consciousness" (2018). Law Faculty
Scholarly Articles. 625.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/625

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

The Lion, the Bat & the Thermostat: Metaphors on Consciousness
Notes/Citation Information
Brian L. Frye, The Lion, the Bat & the Thermostat: Metaphors on Consciousness, 5 Savannah Law Review
13 (2018), https://www.savannahlawschool.org/wp-content/uploads/volume5number1-article02.pdf

This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/625

Savannah

Law Review
VOLUME 5 │ NUMBER 1

The Lion, the Bat & the Thermostat: Metaphors
on Consciousness
Brian L. Frye*
Abstract
Can robots have rights? It depends on the meaning of “robots” and
1
“rights.” Different kinds of robots can have different kinds of rights. Robots can
already have the rights of things, and may soon be able to have the rights of legal
entities. But it is unclear whether robots can have the rights of animals or persons.
It probably depends on what theory of mind is true: dualist, reductionist, or
agnostic. Under a dualist theory, robots can have rights if they possess a soul or
other form of mental substance. Under a reductionist theory, robots can have
rights if they are conscious, or at least functionally identical to a human or animal.
And under an agnostic theory, it depends on how brains actually work.
Philosophers often use metaphors to explore problems they do not
understand, and philosophers of mind are no exception. I will describe three
metaphors used by philosophers of mind - the lion, the bat, and the thermostat and reflect on how those metaphors may illuminate our speculations on the
possibility of “robot rights.”
Introduction
But we cannot reckon with what is lost when we start out to transform
the world. Man shall be free and supreme; he shall have no other aim, no
*

Spears-Gilbert Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky School of Law.
J.D., New York University School of Law, 2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute,
1997; B.A, University of California, Berkeley, 1995. Thanks to Patrick S. O’Donnell,
Andrew K. Woods, Charles Colman, and Katrina Dixon for their helpful suggestions.
1
As David Gunkel observes, the question of whether robots can have rights is
distinct from the questions of whether robots should have rights. Perhaps we should treat
robots as if they have rights, even if they lack “patiency” or moral agency. David J.
Gunkel, The other question: can and should robots have rights?, Ethics Inf. Tech.
(2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-017-9442-4.
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other labor, no other care than to perfect himself. He shall serve neither
matter nor man. He will not be a machine and a device for production.
2
He will be Lord of creation.
On October 25, 2017, Saudi Arabia granted “citizenship” to a humanoid
3
robot named “Sophia.” Obviously, Sophia’s “naturalization” was purely
symbolic, as “she” is an object that manifests only an amusing simulacrum of
personhood. But many still found it ironic, as Saudi Arabia discriminates against
women and denies citizenship to most foreign residents. Nevertheless, even
Sophia’s ersatz citizenship encourages speculation as to whether a robot could
actually become a citizen and exercise the rights of citizenship.
I.

Can Robots Have Rights?
“I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’ This
should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms ‘machine’
4
and ‘think.’”

In his 1992 article, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, Lawrence
Solum explored the possibility of “robot rights” by asking whether an artificial
5
intelligence could become a legal person. More specifically, he asked whether an
artificial intelligence could serve as a trustee, and whether an artificial intelligence
6
could claim the constitutional rights of a natural person. He asked these
pragmatic legal questions in order to investigate the practical consequences of
7
philosophical claims relating to the possibility of artificial intelligence.
Solum concluded that an artificial intelligence capable of passing the Turing
Test probably could serve as a trustee, because it could insure against negligence,
could not engage in conduct requiring deterrence, and could exercise judgment
8
sufficient to administer most trusts under most circumstances. Likewise, he
argued that an artificial intelligence capable of passing the Turing Test could and
should be entitled to claim at least some of the constitutional rights of a natural
9
person.
2

Karel Čapek, R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots) I-26 (Paul Selver & Nigel Playfair
trans.,1920), http://preprints.readingroo.ms/RUR/rur.pdf.
3
See Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Saudi Arabia, which denies women equal rights, makes a
robot a citizen, Wash. Post (Oct. 29, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/10/29/saudi-arabiawhich-denies-women-equal-rights-makes-a-robot-a-citizen/; Cristina Maza, Saudi Arabia
Gives Citizenship to a Non-Muslim, English-Speaking Robot, Newsweek (Oct. 26, 2017
4:08 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/saudi-arabia-robot-sophia-muslim-694152; Tracy
Alloway, Saudi Arabia Gives Citizenship to a Robot, Bloomberg (Oct. 26, 2017 10:41
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-26/saudi-arabia-givescitizenship-to-a-robot-claims-global-first.
4
Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 Mind 433, 433 (1950).
5
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. Rev.
1231, 1231 (1992).
6
Id. at 1232, 1234, 1240, 1257.
7
Id. at 1232.
8
Id. at 1248.
9
Id. at 1257–58, 1261, 1270, 1275, 1280.
14
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While Solum acknowledged the various philosophical theories of mind, he
11
concluded that they were largely irrelevant to the legal questions at issue. He
observed that if an artificial intelligence could simulate a human being in all
relevant respects, it probably would not matter if the artificial intelligence lacked
12
“consciousness,” however defined. “My prediction (and it is only that) is that
the lack of real intentionality would not make much difference if it became useful
13
for us to treat AIs as intentional systems in our daily lives.”
Solum was probably right. If an artificial intelligence were indistinguishable
from a human being in all relevant respects, courts probably would and should
allow it to assert the legal rights of a human being. Of course, if science develops
an empirical theory of consciousness, then courts probably would not and should
not allow an artificial intelligence that merely simulates consciousness, without
actually being conscious, to assert those rights. But in the absence of such an
empirical theory, courts would probably dismiss concerns about the possibility of
a “philosophical zombie.”
But what if Solum’s questions were considered from the opposite
perspective? He asked whether courts would and should allow an artificial
intelligence that replicates a human being to assert legal rights, and avoided
14
philosophical questions about the nature of consciousness. By contrast, I will ask
what different theories of mind imply about whether and when an artificial
intelligence could and should be allowed to assert different kinds of legal rights.
Can robots have rights? It depends on the meaning of “robots” and “rights.”
Different kinds of robots can have different kinds of rights. Robots can already
have the rights of things, and may soon be able to have the rights of legal entities.
But it is unclear whether robots can have the rights of animals or persons. It
probably depends on what theory of mind is true: dualist, reductionist, or agnostic.
Under a dualist theory, robots can have rights if they possess a soul or other form
15
of mental substance. Under a reductionist theory, robots can have rights if they
16
are conscious, or at least functionally identical to a human or animal. And under
17
a “mysterian” or agnostic theory, it depends on how brains actually work.
Setting aside formal theories of mind, how do we actually think about
consciousness? Philosophers often use metaphors to explore problems they do not
10

Id. at 1263, 1270.
Id. at 1263, 1270.
12
Id. at 1264–66.
13
Id. at 1282.
14
Id. at 1266.
15
Howard Robinson, Dualism, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (Edward N. Zalta
ed., Fall 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/. See also Solum supra note 5,
at 1263.
16
See Alyssa Ney, Reuctionism, Internet Encyclopedia Phil.,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/; Saul McLeod, Reductionism and Holism,
SimplyPsychology (2008), https://simplypsychology.org/reductionismholism.html.
17
Rocco J. Gennaro, Consciousness, Internet Encyclopedia Phil.,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/consciou/#SSH3b.iii; Mysterianism lite, 3 nature
neuroscience 199, 199 (2000), https://www.nature.com/articles/nn0300_199.pdf;
11
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understand. As Thomas Nagel wryly observed, “philosophers share the general
human weakness for explanations of what is incomprehensible in terms suited for
18
what is familiar and well understood, though entirely different.” Philosophers of
mind are no exception. I will describe three metaphors used by philosophers of
mind—the lion, the bat, and the thermostat—and reflect on how those metaphors
19
may illuminate our speculations on the possibility of “robot rights.”
II. What is a Robot?
“That man is the noblest creature may also be inferred from the fact that no
20
other creature has yet contested this claim.”
The word “robot” was coined in 1920 by the Czech writer and painter Josef
Čapek, for use in his brother Karel Čapek’s play R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal
22
21
Robots). The Czech word “robota” means “serf” or “compulsory labor.” In
Čapek’s play, a factory manufactures artificial people or “robots” for use as
slaves. Initially, the robots lack consciousness and are docile, but some of the
robots become self-aware and incite a robot rebellion, which eventually leads to
the extinction of humanity.
Today, a “robot” is typically defined as “a machine capable of carrying out a
23
complex series of actions automatically.” Robots take many forms and can
perform a wide variety of tasks. Most robots consist of a machine controlled by a
computer, either directly or remotely. As robots become increasingly
sophisticated, they can supplement or replace human labor in many contexts.
Industrial robots substitute for human labor in factories, domestic robots
substitute for human labor in and around homes, and military robots substitute for
human labor on the battlefield. Most robots are designed to perform a particular
task or set of tasks. But some humanoid robots are designed to resemble a human
and replicate human behavior, to a greater or lesser degree. Currently, robots can
24
resemble humans closely enough to be creepy (the “uncanny valley”), but not
18

Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like To Be a Bat?, 83 Phil. Rev. 435, 435 (1974).
See generally David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of
Fundamental Theory (1996).
20
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, The Waste Books D 58 (R.J.
Hollingdale trans., 1990) (page 52 of the R.J. Hollingdale translation).
21
Dominik Zunt, Who did actually invent the word “robot” and what does it mean?
(citing Karel Capek, About the Word Robot (Norma Comrada, trans., Dec. 24, 1993)),
https://web.archive.org/web/20130123023343/http://capek.misto.cz/english/robot.htm
l (“‘But,’ the author said, ‘I don’t know what to call these artificial workers. I could call
them Labori, but that strikes me as a bit bookish.’ ‘Then call them Robots,’ the painter
muttered, brush in mouth, and went on painting.”); see also Robot, Oxford English
Dictionary (2018), https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/robot.
22
Science Diction: The Origin of the Word ‘Robot’, science friday (Apr. 22, 2011),
https://www.sciencefriday.com/segments/science-diction-the-origin-of-the-wordrobot/.
23
Robot, supra note 21.
24
Masahiro Mori, The Uncanny Valley: The Original Essay by Masahiro Mori, 7
Energy 33 (1970) (Karl F. MacDorman & Norri Kageki, trans.),
http://www.movingimages.info/digitalmedia/wpcontent/uploads/2010/06/MorUnc.pdf.
19
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closely enough to fool anyone, and robots can only replicate formulaic human
behaviors. They certainly cannot replicate human thought.
Often unwittingly, we use robots and artificial intelligence as metaphors to
discuss uncomfortable ideas. The thinking robot is a “hypothetical” that enables
a form of cathexis. Ironically, while Čapek explicitly used his robots as metaphors
for every social evil under the sun—slavery, class warfare, nationalism, and so
on—today, we are so comfortable with the “robot metaphor” that we often forget
it is a metaphor at all.
For example, science-fiction authors often imagine robots that replicate
25
humans, in appearance or behavior. These imaginary robots typically possess
“artificial intelligence,” meaning that they are conscious, or at least exhibit the
objective indicia of consciousness, like the ability to engage in abstract reasoning
and communicate with humans in natural language. In other words, they act as if
they were humans, albeit often curiously affectless or otherwise peculiar ones.
A cynic might observe that science-fiction’s stock artificially intelligent robot
resembles Andy Kaufman’s character Latka from the sitcom Taxi: a person who
fails to behave or respond to social cues in the expected way. This should come as
no surprise, as science-fiction has always used robots as metaphors for the Other,
a comfortable way to ask uncomfortable questions, typically whether and how
difference can be assimilated. In other words, we use “imaginary robots” as a
proxy for “difference” and a way of thinking about our relationship to other
people. They can tell us a great deal about ourselves, but can tell us nothing about
the machines they purport to represent.
A. What is “Artificial Intelligence”?
“Artificial intelligence” is increasingly a buzzword in computer science and
other fields. In the broadest sense, artificial intelligence means a human-made
26
machine that can replicate a cognitive function of a human. The idea of artificial
intelligence has existed since time immemorial, from Pygmalion’s living statue of
27
28
29
Galatea and Hephaestus’s bronze man Talos, to the Golem of Jewish legend
30
and Yan Shi’s automaton, to King Ajatashatru of Magadha’s mechanical

25

Joanna J. Bryson et al., Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons,
25 Artif. Intell. L. 273 (2017) (“Fiction abounds with artificial human-like
characters: robots, clones, and bioengineered humanoids. But fiction dwells on artists’
conceptions of the human condition, and the contexts in which that condition might or
might not be altered.”).
26
A Holistic Approach to AI, Strong AI,
https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~arihuang/academic/research/strongai3.html.
27
Ancient Robots Of The World, Think Studio: Originality & Clarity
(Jan. 28, 2017), https://thinkstudiosite.wordpress.com/2017/01/28/ancient-robots-ofthe-world/.
28
Id.
29
Alden Oreck, Modern Jewish History: The Golem, Jewish Virtual Library:
A Project of Aice, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-golem.
30
Ancient Robots Of The World, supra note 27.
17
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32

guards and Rocail’s autonomous statutes. But it became salient in the 20th
century, when we invented computers. And it left the realm of science-fiction in
the 21st century, when computers began to compete with and replace humans in
the knowledge economy.
But the meaning of the term “artificial intelligence” still depends on the
context in which it is used. Specifically, scholars and researchers typically
33
distinguish between “weak” and “strong” artificial intelligence. The terms are
not intended as an assessment of the value of different forms of artificial
intelligence, but rather a description of how they work and what they are intended
to accomplish. Indeed, “weak” artificial intelligence is rapidly transforming
contemporary society, while “strong” artificial intelligence remains a pipe
34
dream.
B. “Weak” Artificial Intelligence
“Weak” artificial intelligence is the ability to replicate a cognitive function of
35
a human by any means. Specifically, weak artificial intelligence does not require
consciousness. Ironically, weak artificial intelligence has proven incredibly
powerful. In particular, machine learning and other techniques have enabled
computers to accomplish many tasks that previously required human
intervention, often more efficiently than humans can accomplish those tasks.
While weak artificial intelligence presents certain normative concerns, especially
36
when it relies on “black box algorithms” that cannot be reverse-engineered, it
has already begun to transform contemporary society, and surely will only become
more important.

31

Id.
Id.
33
See generally Strong v. Weak AI,
https://www.math.nyu.edu/~neylon/cra/strongweak.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (on
file with author); Philosophical Arguments Against “Strong” AI,
https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~mooney/cs343/slide-handouts/philosophy.4.pdf.
34
Weak Artificial Intelligence (Weak AI), Technopedia,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/31621/weak-artificial-intelligence-weak-ai
describes how Apple’s Siri has continued to improve over the years, and similar can be
said about Alexa and car manufacturers. See also Michael Hicks, Hitting the road: How
Google Assistant, Alexa and AI are coming to your car, techradar (Jan. 10, 2018); Chris
Neiger, Artificial Intelligence Investments Aren’t Just a Pipe Dream—Here’s Why, The
Motely Fool (Oct. 22, 2017),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/10/22/artificial-intelligence-stock-gains-arentjust-a-p.aspx. C.f. Jacob Sage, Consciousness, Artificial Intelligence, and Automatic
Transmission: Artificial intelligence may be a pipe dream, Psychol. Today (Feb. 9,
2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/mind-brain-andconsciousness/201202/consciousness-artificial-intelligence-and-automatic.
35
Weak Artificial Intelligence (Weak AI), supra note 34.
36
Christina Mulligan, Revenge Against Robots, (forthcoming South Carolina Law
Review, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3016048.
32
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C. “Strong” Artificial Intelligence
37

“Strong” artificial intelligence is a human-made conscious entity. Of
course, it is trivially true that strong artificial intelligence is possible. Every human
is a strong artificial intelligence, and we create a strong artificial intelligence every
time we reproduce. Indeed, almost every living thing is a strong artificial
intelligence, or at least a step on the way to strong artificial intelligence. The world
tells us not only that strong artificial intelligence is possible, but also that it can
take many different forms. In other words, we know that strong artificial
intelligence is possible, because all intelligence is strong artificial intelligence, but
we don’t know what causes strong artificial intelligence, or how we create it.
While computer science has many successes in creating weak artificial
intelligence, it has no successes in creating strong artificial intelligence. We have
created computers that can solve all manner of different problems, and surely will
create computers that can solve ever more problems, but we cannot create
computers that are recognizably conscious, or even smack of consciousness. Our
computers can do many things, but they cannot reproduce the behavior of even
38
the simplest biological organism, let alone a human being.
For example, scientists have learned an immense amount about and from the
39
roundworm C. elegans. They have even mapped all 302 neurons in its brain. But
40
they still do not know how its brain actually works. Indeed, they cannot even
41
model the functionality of this simplest of brains. Surely, neurologists will
37

Strong vs. Weak AI, supra note 33.
See generally Pat Langley, Intelligent Behavior in Humans and Machines, 2
Advances in Cognitive Sys. 3 (2012), http://www.cogsys.org/pdf/paper-3-2140.pdf; Larry Greenemeir, Visionary Research: Teaching Computers to See Like a Human,
Scientific American (Feb. 20, 2008),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/visionary-research/; Maciamo Hay, Could a
machine or an AI ever feel human-like emotions?, Vita Modularis (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.vitamodularis.org/articles/could_a_machine_feel_humanlike_emotions.shtml.
39
See generally Sydney Brenner, Nobel Prize Winner, Nobel Lecture: Nature’s Gift
to Science (Dec. 8, 2002),
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2002/brennerlecture.pdf.
40
C. elegans nervous system, SFU Department of Biological Sciences: Developmental
Neurobiololgy Laboratory (Jan. 12, 2008),
http://www.sfu.ca/biology/faculty/hutter/hutterlab/research/Ce_nervous_system.html
.
41
See Ferris Jabr, The Connectome Debate: Is Mapping the Mind of a Worm Worth It?,
Scientific American (Oct. 2, 2012) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/celegans-connectome/. This article provides information proposing the idea of creating a
connectome of the human brain, but the debate centers on the connectome of C. elegans,
which “has not provided many insights into the worm’s behavior.” Id. Further, Anthony
Movshon of New York University stated, “I think it’s fair to say . . . that our
understanding of the worm has not been materially enhanced by having that connectome
available to us. We don’t have a comprehensive model of how the worm’s nervous system
actually produces the behaviors . . . . But that connectome by itself has not explained
anything.” Id. Further, through producing a connectome, scientists have realized how
much they “underscored the staggering intricacy of even a relatively small nervous
38
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eventually solve the puzzle of the roundworm brain, and with it every other brain.
But they are not yet close. Indeed, it is not yet clear that they even know what
questions to ask.
III. What Are Rights?
Broadly defined, “[r]ights are entitlements (not) to perform certain actions,
or (not) to be in certain states; or entitlements that others (not) perform certain
42
actions or (not) be in certain states.” For the purpose of this article, I will
consider only “legal rights,” or “rights which exist under the rules of legal
43
systems or by virtue of decisions of suitably authoritative bodies within them.”
Different definitions of rights provide that different kinds of entities can have legal
rights. If rights protect interests, then any entity that would benefit from another’s
performance of a legal duty can have legal rights, but if rights protect choices, then
only entities that can perform a legal duty can have legal rights.
In considering the possibility of “robot rights,” it may be helpful to identify
different categories of entities, and the kinds of rights that each of those categories
of entities may hold. The kinds of rights a robot can have will depend on which
categories of entity a robot can occupy: non-person or person, thing or animal,
legal person or natural person.
A. Rights of Non-persons
Inanimate things and non-human animals can have interests, and therefore
44
can possess certain kinds of rights in certain circumstances. Historically, certain
45
temples, churches, and relics could possess legal rights for some purposes. The
law of deodands provided that chattel property and animals could be held legally
46
responsible for a person’s death. In rem jurisdiction provides that chattel
property can be the subject of legal proceeding. And the law often provides certain
47
rights and protections to non-human animals. Of course, non-persons cannot

system” in a C. elegans. Id. Imagine how much more work and time would have to go into
a human connectome, especially since scientists have not completely understood C.
elegans’ nervous system.
42
Rights, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/.
43
Legal Rights, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter
2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-rights/.
44
John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 46–49
(The Macmillan Company 2d ed. 1931) (1909).
45
See id. (observing that Roman law treated certain temples as legal persons for some
purposes, and that the medieval law of many European also treated certain churches and
relics as legal persons for some purposes).
46
See, e.g., Anna Pervukhin, Deodands: A Study in the Creation of Common Law Rules,
47 Am. J. L. Hist. 237, 237 (2005). In theory, the law of deodands could be revived
and applied to robots. Mulligan, supra note 36.
47
See generally Joyce Tischler, The History of Animal Law, Part I (1972–1987), 1
Stan. J. Animal L. & Pol’y 1 (2008); Anthony D’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra,
Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 Am. J. Int’l L. 21 (1991).
20
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themselves assert legal rights, and must rely on persons to assert those rights on
their behalf.
1.

Rights of Things

The law protects certain inanimate things that may benefit from legal
protection. Indeed, one could view property law as the law of the rights of things
and how those rights may be asserted. From a law and economics perspective, we
observe that protecting the “rights” of rivalrous things may increase their
contribution to net social welfare, by reducing transaction costs and facilitating
48
efficient uses. And from a normative perspective, we observe that the law often
protects the “rights” of certain inanimate things in order to recognize and express
their social value. Historic preservation laws protect certain historic and
49
archaeological sites from certain kinds of uses that will reduce their social value.
Moral rights laws protect certain works of authorship from alteration or
50
destruction. And environmental laws protect certain ecosystems from alteration
51
or destruction. Legal scholars have argued that those rights should extend more
52
broadly to ensure and facilitate the protection of socially valuable things. Surely,
some or all of the forms of legal rights granted to things could be extended to
robots as well, if we believed that it would be socially beneficial to do so.
2.

Rights of Animals
53

The law also protects certain animals under certain circumstances. For
54
example, many laws prohibit the abuse of domestic animals. Other laws prohibit
55
certain forms of abuse of livestock. And still other laws protect certain forms of
56
wildlife in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. Some scholars have
57
argued that similar rights should extend to all living things. Of course, animals
and other living things cannot assert rights on their own behalf, any more than
things. But it is unclear whether robots could have the kinds of legal rights given
48

Jeremy Kidd, Kindergarten Coase, 17 Green Bag 2d. 141, 146–47, 155 (2014).
See generally National Historic Preservation Act of 1966; 54 U.S.C.A. § 100101.
50
See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A (2012); The Berne Convention (1988).
51
See generally North American Wetlands Conservation Act, (P.L. 101–233) (1989).
52
See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Earth and Other Ethics (1987).
53
See generally Cass Sunstein & Martha Nussbaum, Animal Rights:
Current Debates and New Directions (2004).
54
See generally Animal Cruelty Laws State by State, Stray Pet Advocacy,
http://www.straypetadvocacy.org/PDF/AnimalCrueltyLaws.pdf; Animal Protection Laws
of the United States of America and Canada, American Legal Defense Fund,
http://aldf.org/resources/advocating-for-animals/animal-protection-laws-of-the-unitedstates-of-america-and-canada/.
55
See generally David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law: Agribusinesses and the Systematic
Abuse of Animals Raised for Food or Food Production, 2 Animal L. 123 (1996); Farmed
Animals and the Law, Animal Legal Defense Fund,
http://aldf.org/resources/advocating-for-animals/farmed-animals-and-the-law/.
56
See The Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 et seq.
57
See Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450, 456–58 (1972).
49
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to animals and other living things, because it is unclear whether robots could ever
become the moral equivalent of an animal or living thing. In any case, they
certainly are not today, although people may impute moral significance to robot
58
“welfare.”
B. Rights of Persons
Only persons can assert legal rights on their own behalf. But personhood has
different meanings in different contexts, and grants different rights to different
59
categories of persons. How should we determine what kinds of entities can
qualify as persons and what rights each category of persons can claim?
The word “person” has both a colloquial and legal meaning. A colloquial
60
“person” is any human being, but a legal “person” is any subject of legal rights.
Accordingly, a legal person can be a “natural person,” i.e., a human, or a
“juridical person,” i.e., a legal entity that can have certain legal rights. Courts
have long held that corporations (and more recently limited liability companies)
are legal persons, entitled to certain legal rights. For example, the Supreme Court
recently held that corporate persons can assert the right to free speech under the
61
First Amendment.
How should we determine whether an artificial intelligence can have
particular rights? A functionalist approach would determine the purpose of the
62
right and whether extending it would further that purpose. In other words, the
existence of a right would depend on both the nature of the right and the nature of
63
the claimant.
It seems like a different question to ask whether an artificial intelligence could
have the rights of a legal entity versus the rights of a natural person. It is true that
one reason legal entities can have some of the rights of a constitutional person is
because they are ultimately controlled by natural persons. A legal entity does not
and cannot make decisions on its own. Its decisions are made by one or more
natural persons acting as its agents. But many entities do not have some of the
58

See generally Eric Schwitzgebel, We have greater moral obligations to robots than to
humans, Aeon (Nov. 11, 2015), https://aeon.co/ideas/we-have-greater-moralobligations-to-robots-than-to-humans. Schwitzgebel believes that if robots are created
with human-like cognitive and emotional capacities, we owe them more moral
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rights of constitutional persons, like partnerships and trusts. This is a purely
functional question. Sometimes it makes sense to extend constitutional
personhood to a particular kind of legal entity under circumstances, and
sometimes it does not.
But it could never be the case that a legal entity could become a natural person.
Legal entities are a means to an end. Natural persons are ends in themselves. The
purpose of a legal entity is to enable natural persons to achieve their ends more
efficiently.
Ultimately, whether an artificial intelligence can be a natural person is a
fundamentally different question. Currently, we assume that robots are things. Is
it possible that an artificially intelligent robot could be a natural person? Or will
robots always be something other than a natural person? And if so, how should we
categorize them? It seems that the answer must depend on whether strong
artificial intelligence is possible, and if so, what it will look like.
To put it differently, it seems unproblematic that a robot could have legal
64
personhood, in the way that a legal entity can have legal personhood.
65
Accordingly, as Solum recognizes, a robot’s actions could be legally binding.
This does not seem fundamentally different from holding that the actions of a legal
entity can be binding. The only question is when? While that is a difficult question,
it is no more difficult than the question of when a corporation should be treated as
66
a legal person. We do not have a coherent theory of corporate personhood,
67
either.
Likewise, robots could be protected as a separate category, distinct from legal
persons. For example, slaves were often protected as a separate legal category, in
68
order to avoid the question of whether a slave was a “person” under the law.
And today, fetuses are protected as a separate category, because the Supreme
69
Court has held that a fetus is not a person.
Questions about whether rights should attach necessarily implicate
conclusions about the purpose of those rights. In the case of robots, the question
is how they are properly characterized. Or rather the question “can robots have
rights” is a metaphysical question about what theory of mind is actually true. But
“should robots have rights” is a political question about who will be included in
the political community.
Why does it matter? Because the “person” metaphor contains considerable
expressive content. When courts denied the personhood of slaves, they often
64
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expressed considerable reluctance. And when the Supreme Court denied the
71
personhood of a fetus, it did so only with hesitation and uncertainty. Ultimately,
the question of “robot rights” is fraught only because we use the “robot”
metaphor to ask uncomfortable questions about the “person” metaphor. Asking
questions about “robot rights” allows us to ask sublimated questions about who
qualifies for legal personhood and why.
1.

Rights of Juridical Persons

The law enables certain legal entities to assert certain legal rights as legal
persons, specifically corporations and limited liability companies. Legal entities
can have a wide range of legal rights, but cannot have all of the legal rights
associated with natural persons. For example, a corporation is a legal person for
the purposes of the First Amendment right of free speech, the Fourth
Amendment rights to privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Fifth Amendment right to freedom from double jeopardy and
takings, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and trial by jury, and the
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. But a
corporation is not a legal person for the purpose of the Fifth Amendment right to
freedom from self-incrimination, the right to appointed counsel, or the Privileges
72
and Immunities Clause.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly articulated a theory of when legal
entities are constitutional persons, but it tends to take a functionalist approach,
asking whether extending a particular right or duty to a corporation would further
the purpose of that right or duty. For example, the Supreme Court found that the
purpose of the First Amendment right to free speech is to protect the
dissemination of speech from government interference, regardless of its source,
so extending the right to legal entities was consistent with the purpose of the
73
right.
On occasion, the Supreme Court has engaged in a surprising amount of
anthropomorphism in explaining its conclusion that certain legal rights extend to
74
corporations. For example, it found that the Fifth Amendment protection
against double jeopardy extended to corporations in order to prevent
75
“embarrassment . . . anxiety . . . and insecurity . . . .” And it found that the
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Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches extends to
76
corporations based on their reasonable expectation of privacy.
Whether legal entities can have certain legal rights should depend only on
whether it is socially beneficial to allow them to assert those rights as legal entities.
Imputing beliefs and feelings to a legal entity is nonsensical and unhelpful. The
legal rights of a legal entity should depend on its function and purpose, and
whether extending particular rights will further that function and purpose.
Likewise, whether robots can have the rights of a juridical person is a
functional question. If a robot can accomplish the functions of a legal entity, then
77
surely it can and probably should have the rights of a legal entity. After all, in a
sense, a corporation is like an imaginary legal robot, responding to the various
needs and desires of its shareholders and stakeholders, for whose benefit it exists.
2.

Rights of Natural Persons

Natural persons or “humans” have the most legal rights. But not all natural
persons have the same legal rights, or can assert those rights on their own behalf.
Some people have limited rights, like noncitizens and felons. Others have rights
that can only be asserted by others, like children and mentally-disabled persons.
While the Supreme Court typically assumes that natural persons are legal
persons, it asks whether particular rights extend to particular classes of natural
78
persons under particular circumstances. Accordingly, noncitizens are legal
persons who lack certain rights, based on their citizenship status, and felons are
legal persons who lack certain rights, based on their prior actions. In neither case
is there a question about their ontological status, only their ability to assert certain
legal claims.
While mentally-disabled people cannot assert their own rights, they still have
79
rights, which a surrogate can assert on their behalf. Likewise, minors have rights,
which may be asserted by their parents or some other surrogate.
Whether robots can have the rights of a natural person necessarily depends
on which theory of mind is true. If a computer can be conscious, then a robot can
have the rights of a natural person, and vice versa.
IV. The Philosophy of Mind
Philosophers have pondered the “mind-body” problem since time
immemorial, and developed a vast congeries of metaphysical theories of mind.
While the number and variety of those theories defies comprehensive summary,
they broadly fall into two categories: dualism and physicalism. Essentially, dualist
theories hold that mental states and physical states are ontologically distinct, and
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physicalist theories hold that mental states are just physical states. In other
words, dualist theories hold that mind and body are separate, and physicalist
theories hold that they are the same.
A. Dualism
Dualist theories of mind hold that the mind and the body are distinct and that
81
mental states cannot be reduced to physical states.
Classical dualism
distinguished between material bodies and immaterial forms, including the soul.
Platonic dualism held that the soul is an immaterial form imprisoned in a material
body, and Aristotelian dualism held that the soul is an immaterial form realized in
82
a material body.
Modern dualism began with Cartesian “substance” dualism, which held that
there are two kinds of substance: matter, which has the essential property of
83
physical extension; and mind, which has the essential property of thinking. By
contrast, “property” dualism holds that mind or consciousness is a non-physical
property of physical substance, either a fundamental property of reality or an
84
emergent property of complex physical systems.
Dualist theories of mind often rely on intuitions about subjective experiences
or “qualia” and the conceivability of a mind existing without a body, and vice versa.
For example, the “zombie hypothesis” relies on the conceivability of a
“philosophical zombie” or person lacking consciousness as evidence of the mindbody distinction. The persistent objection to dualist theories of mind is that they
cannot explain the existence of non-physical things, or how they interact with
physical things.
Under a dualist theory of mind, it seems unproblematic that a robot could
have the rights of a natural person if and only if it can possess an immaterial soul
or mind that enables it to have mental states. If a robot cannot have mental states,
it cannot be a subject of legal rights. But a mindless robot could have the rights of
a thing or a legal entity.
B. Physicalism
Physicalist theories of mind hold that everything supervenes on the physical
world, including the mind. While there are many different physicalist theories of
mind, they broadly fall into two categories: reductionist and non-reductionist.
Reductionist theories typically holds that mental states are just brain states. The
dominant reductionist theory is the computational theory of mind, which holds
that the brain is just a universal Turing machine, and that consciousness, however
80
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defined, can be realized on any universal Turing machine, including a computer.
Non-reductionist theories are characterized more by what they question than
what they claim. In general, they observe that we do not know how the brain works
or what it means to say that a mental state is identical to a brain state, and therefore
86
cannot make claims about the nature of consciousness or how it can be realized.
While non-reductionist theories of mind are often rather pejoratively termed
“mysterian,” I will refer to them as “agnostic” theories of mind, as they generally
do not deny the computation theory of mind and its presumption of “multiple
realizability,” but assert the “Scotch verdict” of “not proven” and suggest
87
waiting for more evidence.
1.

Turing Machines & the Turing Test

The English computer scientist, mathematician, logician, cryptanalyst,
philosopher and theoretical biologist Alan Mathison Turing was one of the
greatest thinkers of the twentieth century. Among many other things, he
conceived of the general purpose computer and invented computer science. In
1936, Turing explained how to create a machine that could be used to compute
88
any computable sequence. The machine he described became known as a
“universal Turing machine,” and provided the theoretical framework for the
general purpose computer. A “Turing machine” is a mathematical model of
computation that defines an abstract machine, which manipulates symbols on a
strip of tape according to a table of rules, and a universal Turing machine is a
89
machine that can simulate any other Turing machine. John von Neumann built
on Turing’s ideas to propose the von Neumann architecture that is the basis of
90
the modern computer.
But Turing was also the father of artificial intelligence. In 1950, he famously
91
proposed a test to determine whether a computer could think. Under the
“Turing test” for artificial intelligence, a human must pose a series of questions,
which are answered by both a human and a computer. If the human questioner
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cannot distinguish between the human and computer answers, then the computer
has passed the Turing test.
Essentially, Turing reframed the question “Can machines think?” as “Can
machines imitate thinking?” And in so doing, he implicitly proposed a
computational theory of mind. Interestingly, the Turing test for artificial
intelligence was anticipated in the negative by Rene Descartes in the seventeenth
century:
If any such machines bore a resemblance to our bodies and imitated our
actions as was practically possible, we should still have two very sure
signs that they were nevertheless not real men. . . . The first is that they
could never use words or other constructed signs as we do to declare our
thoughts to others. We can easily conceive of a machine so constructed
that it utters words, and even utters words that correspond to bodily
actions causing a change in its organs. . . . [But it is not conceivable] that
such a machine should produce different sequences of words so as to give
an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence—
92
which is something that the dullest of men can do.
While Turing disclaimed any intention to question the “mystery” of
consciousness, he suggested that “thinking” may not require consciousness. “I
do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about
consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any
attempt to localize it. But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be
solved before we can answer the question with which we are concerned in this
93
paper.”
Of course, there are many objections to the Turing test for artificial
intelligence, many of which were anticipated and addressed in the paper proposing
94
the test. Critics have argued that it is too easy and too hard; too narrow and too
broad; neither logically necessary nor sufficient; dangerous or harmful; and
95
defeasible or merely probabilistic. The strength of the Turing test is that it
proposes a functional account of intelligence, under which intelligence is simply
whatever produces the appearance of intelligence.
2.

Reductionism

Today, the prevailing theory of mind is the computational theory, which
holds that a mind is simply a “universal Turing machine” or “computational
96
system”: an information processing machine that can perform any calculation.
Hilary Putnam introduced the computational theory of mind in 1967, and it soon
92
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became the dominant theory of mind. The classical computational theory holds
98
that mental states are functional states that are multiply realizable, and that a
system has a mind if it has a suitable functional organization. There are several
variations on the computational theory. For example, the representational theory
99
holds that mental states are computational, but not necessarily functional. And
connectionist theories hold that mental states are computational, but in the form
100
of a neural network, not a Turing machine.
Proponents of the computational theory of mind take different positions on
intentionality, or the “aboutness” of mental states, ranging from intentional
realism, which holds that intentionality is a real property of mental states, to
101
eliminativism, which holds that it is not. Some philosophers stake out a middle
ground, like Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson, who observe that the concept
of intentionality is useful, but imply that it may not be a real property of mental
102
states.
There are many criticisms of the computational theory of mind, including
triviality, the “incompleteness” of Turing machines, functional limitations on
computational modeling, its underspecification of temporality, and its failure to
103
account for interactions between the mind and body.
But the best-known
objection to the computational theory of mind is the “Chinese Room” argument.
Under reductionist theories of mind, including the computational theory of
mind, it seems unproblematic that a robot could have the rights of a natural
104
person. After all, under the computational theory of mind, a brain is just a
computational system, so an artificially intelligent robot is functionally identical
105
to a natural person. And if a robot can possess “patiency” or the capacity to be
a moral subject, it necessarily follows that it can possess the rights of a natural
106
person. Of course, a non-artificially-intelligent robot could have the rights of a
thing or a legal entity.
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The Chinese Room Argument

In 1981, John Searle responded to the computational theory of mind with the
“Chinese Room” argument, a thought experiment intended to show that it is
107
impossible for a digital computer to be conscious. Essentially, Searle imagines
an English-speaking person in a sealed room, which contains instructions in
English for how to manipulate Chinese characters. The person receives Chinese
phrases, follows the instructions, and provides Chinese phrases in response. To
someone outside the room, the English-speaking person in the Chinese Room
appears to understand Chinese. But the person in the room does not actually
understand Chinese.
The Chinese Room is analogous to a computer. Just like the person in the
Chinese Room simply manipulates symbols based on predetermined rules, a
computer simply manipulates data based on predetermined rules. The person in
the Chinese Room does not understand Chinese, and does not need to understand
Chinese. Likewise, a computer does not understand the meaning of the data it
manipulates, and does not need to understand it. Both follow instructions that
create the appearance of understanding the significance of the data they receive
and produce, without actually understanding it. To put it another way, they
manipulate syntax without understanding semantics.
Essentially, the Chinese Room argument is an inversion of the Turing test.
Turing argued that the best test for consciousness is whether a computer acts like
it is conscious. Searle responded that consciousness is a property of the mind that
either exists or does not.
The point of the Chinese Room argument is to refute functional theories of
mind. Searle argues that the point of a theory of mind is to explain consciousness,
but functional theories of mind just explain it away, essentially by saying it doesn’t
exist or doesn’t matter. Specifically, computational theories hold that the mind is
just a computational system. But Searle observed that they provide no theory of
how a computer could become conscious, or even try to account for consciousness
108
or subjective experience.
In addition, Searle observed that proponents of the computational theory of
mind are arguably crypto-dualists. Their assertion that the mind is multiply
109
realizable, a kind of “software” than can run on the “hardware” of the brain
or any other adequate machine, implies that the mind exists independently of the
physical brain.
One common response to the Chinese Room argument is that while the
person in the room doesn’t understand Chinese, the system as a whole
understands Chinese. Accordingly, while the CPU of a computer may not
107
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understand the meaning of the data it manipulates, a computing system as a whole
could understand it. Specifically, perhaps semantics is simply an emergent
property of complex manipulation of syntax, or rather, perhaps meaning is an
emergent property of complex computation.
Another common response is to imagine a “brain simulator,” or machine that
duplicates on a computer every physical process that occurs in a brain. Presumably
such a simulator would be “conscious” in the same way as a brain. Searle has
110
responded that a simulation of consciousness is not the real thing. If a computer
simulates a hurricane, it can predict what the hurricane will do, but it cannot create
a hurricane. Likewise, if a computer can simulate a brain, presumably it could
predict what the brain will do, but it cannot create a brain. According to Searle,
we don’t know what causes consciousness, but we do know that following
instructions doesn’t cause consciousness. Or rather, the appearance of
intentionality is not the same thing as the presence of intentionality.
More fundamentally, critics argue that the Chinese Room argument relies on
intuitions about understanding and consciousness that are unreliable and
inconsistent with scientific knowledge. For example, Daniel Dennett has
dismissed the Chinese Room argument as an “intuition pump,” which draws
fallacious conclusions from a misleading thought experiment. Many supporters of
the computational theory of mind hold that the missing factor is speed, and that
when computers become fast enough, we will see that brains are just fast
computational systems. Searle’s implicit response is that the computational
theory of mind also relies on intuitions about how brains work, and that it is at least
equally likely that the reason the computational theory of mind is false is that
brains do things we don’t yet understand, and digital computers can’t do those
things.
4.

“Mysterianism” or “Agnostic” Theories of Mind

While Searle and other philosophers argue that the computational theory of
mind is wrong, they still believe that physicalism is true. Typically, they argue that
the physical properties of the brain cause consciousness, but we don’t know how,
and we don’t have any reason to believe that the physical properties of a computer
111
can cause consciousness.
In other words, living things are “biological
112
machines” and consciousness is a “biological phenomenon.” If and when we
come to understand how biological processes can cause consciousness, then we
110
111
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may be able to determine whether non-biological processes can also cause
consciousness. But we currently do not have the capacity to answer that question.
It is a mystery. Some “mysterians” believe that humans will never learn how
brains works, because cannot understand consciousness. Others believe that
humans cannot understand how brains work now, but may learn how to answer
the question in the future.
113
Under a mysterian or “agnostic” theory of mind, whether a robot could
have the rights of a natural person depends on it turns out that consciousness
actually works. Presumably, a biological robot could have the rights of a natural
person, if it were conscious. But a non-biological robot could have the rights of a
natural person only if it turns out that non-biological machines can become
conscious. As it stands, the question is unanswerable, because we do not know
what causes consciousness or how brains cause consciousness. Of course, a robot
could have the rights of a thing or a legal entity, if it could satisfy the relevant
criteria.
V. Metaphors on Consciousness
“Imagine a world alive with incomprehensible objects and shimmering with
an endless variety of movement and innumerable gradations of color. Imagine a
114
world before the ‘beginning was the word.’”
Philosophers often use metaphors to illustrate their ideas, and philosophers
of mind are no exception. Specifically, philosophers often use metaphors to
explain their theories of things they do not actually understand. A cynic might say
that metaphors often camouflage unhelpful analogies. In any case, one could
surely write a metaphorical history of philosophy, or at the very least, a history of
philosophical metaphors. I will reflect on three metaphors common to the
philosophy of mind: the lion, the bat, and the thermostat.
A. The Lion
“Long, Long Ago People Used To Say / You're A Lion / You're A Lion,
115
Mama.”

113
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For better or worse, Ludwig Wittgenstein is notoriously quotable. And one
of his most frequently quoted remarks is the gnomic aphorism, “If a lion could
117
talk, we could not understand him.”
Ironically, the lion and the aphorism are equally inscrutable. Taken literally,
the aphorism is obviously false. Lions can already “talk.” They communicate with
each other, and try to communicate with us, with at least some success. When a
lion roars, you get the message. And zoologists study the purpose and meaning of
118
lion vocalizations. If we can interpret the meaning of expressions made by mute
119
lions, surely we could understand a talking lion.
But a literal reading of the aphorism surely misses its point. Wittgenstein
studied epistemology, not zoology. He wasn’t interested in lions, but in the
relationship between language and knowledge.
Many scholars have responded to the aphorism by arguing that we certainly
could understand a talking lion, but it would no longer be a lion. For example,
Daniel Dennett observed, “I think, on the contrary, that if a lion could talk, that
lion would have a mind so different from the general run of lion minds, that
although we could understand him just fine, we would learn little about ordinary
120
lions from him.” And Stephen Budiansky argued that the aphorism “begs the
question: if a lion could talk, we probably could understand him. He just would
121
not be a lion any more; or rather, his mind would no longer be a lion's mind.”
But these responses also miss the point of the aphorism. Wittgenstein was not
speaking about lions or minds, but epistemology. Under his theory of language,
meaning depends on shared experience. We can understand the meaning of
expressions made by other people, because we share the experience of being
people: “The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means
122
of which we interpret an unknown language.” But we cannot understand the
116
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meaning of expressions made by non-human animals, because we cannot share
their experiences. Of course, we can attribute meaning to expressions made by
non-human animals, but we are the ultimate source of that meaning, not the
animal.
Surely, Wittgenstein intended his aphorism to express the proposition that
we could not understand the meaning of a statement made by a lion, because we
cannot share the experience of being a lion. The problem is not that lions cannot
speak, but that the experience of being a lion cannot be expressed in a form that
we can understand. Or rather, we could not understand a talking lion, because its
statements would express an alien experience of the world.
And yet, given the run of the bestiary, why did Wittgenstein speak of a lion?
Historically, the lion was a metaphor for Christ: As the lion is the king of beasts,
123
so too is Christ the king of men. Perhaps Wittgenstein’s aphorism was a veiled
reference to Aslan, the speaking lion and soteriological counterpart of Christ in
C.S. Lewis’s novel, The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe, which was published
124
shortly before Wittgenstein’s death in 1951.
Notably, Wittgenstein was
sympathetic to Catholicism, and expressed a conflicted belief in the divinity of
125
Christ.
Suppose someone said: ‘What do you believe, Wittgenstein? Are you a
sceptic? Do you know whether you will survive death?’ I would really, this is a
fact, say ‘I can’t say. I don’t know’, because I haven’t any clear idea what I am
126
saying when I am saying, ‘I don’t cease to exist.’
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ed., Peter Winch, trans., The University of Chicago Press 1980)
What inclines even me to believe in Christ’s resurrection? It is as
though I play with the thought. –If he did not rise from the dead, then
he decomposed in the grave like any other man. He is dead and
decomposed. In that case he is a teacher like any other and can no longer
help; and once more we are orphaned & alone. So we have to content
ourselves with wisdom and speculation. We are in a sort of hell where
we can do nothing but dream, roofed in, as it were, and cut off from
heaven. But if I am to be REALLY saved,– what I need is certainty – not
wisdom, dreams or speculation – and this certainty is faith. And faith is
faith in what is needed by my heart, my soul, not my speculative
intelligence. For it is my soul with its passions, as it were with its flesh
and blood, that has to be saved, not my abstract mind. Perhaps we can
say: Only love can believe the Resurrection. Or: it is love that believes
the Resurrection.
Id.
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Lewis’s lion was a metaphor for spiritual knowledge: When it speaks, we
understand. Perhaps Wittgenstein’s lion was a metaphor for agnosticism: It
speaks when we cannot understand.
B. The Bat
“I didn’t know that love would strike me / But this is what it’s like / This is
127
what it’s like.”
In his seminal essay, “What is it like to be a bat?,” Thomas Nagel used a
variation on Wittgenstein’s aphorism as a metaphor to question psychophysical
128
reductionism.
Essentially, he argued that a physical theory of mind must
provide a physical explanation of subjective experience.
Nagel assumed that at least some non-human animals are conscious, and
consciousness implies subjective experience. Accordingly, conscious animals
must have subjective experiences. “[T]he fact that an organism has conscious
experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that
129
organism.” So, if bats are conscious, then a bat must have the subjective
experience of being a bat: “the essence of the belief that bats have experience is
130
that there is something that it is like to be a bat.”
But the subjective experience of being a bat is impossible for a human to
imagine. “Even without the benefit of philosophical reflection, anyone who has
spent some time in an enclosed space with an excited bat knows what it is to
131
encounter a fundamentally alien form of life.” For example, some bats use
echolocation to locate and identify objects, emitting ultrasonic calls and
interpreting the echoes to perceive the world around them. While bat echolocation
is a form of perception analogous to human vision, the subjective experience of
perceiving the world via echolocation is inconceivable for humans, who cannot
perceive the world in that way.
In other words, we can understand what bats do, but we cannot understand
what they experience. Of course, neither could a bat understand what humans
experience. By contrast, while we cannot directly experience the subjective
experiences of other humans, we can understand their subjective experiences, but
only because we have similar subjective experiences. Facts about subjective
experience can be objective only because humans share similar subjective
experiences.
Nagel argues that this is a problem for psychophysical reductionism, because
it cannot provide an objective account of subjective experience that does not itself
ultimately rely on subjective experience. “If we acknowledge that a physical
theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must
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admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue how this could be
132
done.”
Psychophysical reductionism holds that mental states are brain states and
mental events are physical events. This may be true. Indeed, it probably is true.
But we do not understand why. “At the present time the status of physicalism is
similar to that which the hypothesis that matter is energy would have had if uttered
by a pre-Socratic philosopher. We do not have the beginnings of a conception of
133
how it might be true.”
C. The Thermostat
“With most people, unbelief in one thing springs from blind belief in
134
another.”
1.

Dennett’s Intentional Thermostat

In his book, The Intentional Stance, Daniel Dennett used a thermostat as a
135
metaphor for an “intentional system.”
He argued that a “system” has
136
“beliefs” if its behavior is predicted by an “intentional strategy.” For example,
a thermostat has beliefs because an intentional strategy can predict its behavior:
“the thermostat will turn off the boiler as soon as it comes to believe the room has
137
reached the desired temperature.” As a consequence, Dennett insists that
consciousness is nothing more than predictable behavior.
The perverse claim remains: all there is to being a true believer is being a
system whose behavior is reliably predictable via the intentional strategy,
and hence all there is to really and truly believing that p (for an proposition
p) is being an intentional system for which p occurs as a belief in the best
138
(most predictive) interpretation.
Of course, even if a thermostat is an intentional system that can have beliefs
and desires, it can’t have very many: “it can believe the room is too cold or too
hot, that the boiler is on or off, and that if it wants the room warmer it should turn
139
on the boiler, and so forth.” But those beliefs and desires can be abstracted and
multiplied. Eventually, a thermostat may come to have beliefs “about heat,” not
only because it regulates heat, but also because it can only regulate heat, and
140
regulates heat in increasingly complicated ways.
According to Dennett, a “belief” or “internal representation” is just a
feature of an intentional system.
132
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There is no magic moment in the transition from a simple thermostat to
a system that really has an internal representation of the world around it.
The thermostat has a minimally demanding representation of the world,
fancier thermostats have more demanding representations of the world,
fancier robots for helping around the house would have still more
141
demanding representations of the world. Finally you reach us.
In other words, a person is just a really complicated thermostat. Of course,
understanding how a thermostat works is easy, but understanding how a person
works is hard. No matter. According to Dennett, it is only a matter of degree, albeit
of great degree.
The principles, and problems, of interpretation that we discover when
we attribute beliefs to people are the same principles and problems we
discover when we look at the ludicrous, but blessedly simple, problem of
attributing beliefs to a thermostat. The differences are of degree, but
nevertheless of such great degree that understanding the internal
organization of a simple intentional system gives one very little basis for
understanding the internal organization of a complex intentional system,
142
such as a human being.
This increase in complexity is what distinguishes a thermostat from a person.
As we ascend the scale of complexity from simple thermostat, through
sophisticated robot, to human being, we discover that our efforts to
design systems with the requisite behavior increasingly run foul of the
problem of combinatorial explosion. Increasing some parameter by, say,
ten percent—ten percent more inputs or more degrees of freedom in the
behavior to be controlled or more words to be recognized or whatever—
tends to increase the internal complexity of the system being designed by
143
orders of magnitude.
According to Dennett, “our brains will eventually be understood as symbol
144
manipulating systems in at least rough analogy with computers.”
If brain
matter is the hardware, then human language is the software, an “elegant,
145
generative, indefinitely extendable” system of representation.
2.

Chalmers’s Conscious Thermostat

In his book The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers turned Dennett’s
thermostat metaphor on its head, arguing that consciousness may be associated
with any information-processing system, including a simple system like a
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146

thermostat. And he did so by repurposing Nagel’s question and asking, “What
147
is it like to be a thermostat?”
Chalmers adopted a dualist theory of mind, holding that consciousness is
148
fundamental property of the world. And he argued that consciousness probably
is associated with any information-processing system, no matter how simple.
Humans are complex systems, with complex experiences. Mice are simpler
systems, with simpler experiences, but presumably they are still conscious. “Mice
may not have much of a sense of self, and may not be given to introspection, but it
149
seems entirely plausible that there is something it is like to be a mouse.” A mouse
has perceptions; surely it also has experiences.
But the same must be true of even simpler animals, like lizards, fishes, and
slugs. They too have perceptions, and therefore must have experiences. So, when
does experience disappear? If a slug, or plant, or tardigrade can perceive the world,
and therefore experience the world, why not a thermostat? “The thermostat
seems to realize the sort of information processing in a fish or a slug stripped down
to its simplest form, so perhaps it might also have the corresponding sort of
150
phenomenology in its most stripped-down form.”
What could a thermostat perceive? Not much.
[L]et us consider an information-processing system that is almost
maximally simple: a thermostat. Considered as an informationprocessing device, a thermostat has just three information states (one
state leads to cooling, another to heating, and another to no action). So
the claim is that to each of these information states, there corresponds a
phenomenal state. These three phenomenal states will all be different,
151
and changing the information state will change the phenomenal state.
But maybe it is enough to support some rudimentary form of consciousness?
Certainly it will not be very interesting to be a thermostat. The
information processing is so simple that we should expect the
corresponding phenomenal states to be equally simple. There will be
three primitively different phenomenal states, with no further structure.
. . . We will likely be unable to sympathetically imagine these experiences
any better than a blind person can imagine sight, or than a human can
imagine what it is like to be a bat; but we can at least intellectually know
152
something about their basic structure.
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Of course, it is hard for us to imagine how a thermostat could have an
experience. Where would the experience happen? But if consciousness is a
fundamental property, then it can be associated with a thermostat in the same way
that it is associated with a brain. “However we make sense of this relation, the
same will apply to thermostats: strictly speaking it is probably best not to say that
the thermostat has the experiences (although I will continue to say this when
153
talking loosely), but that the experiences are associated with the thermostat.”
Indeed, if consciousness is a fundamental property, we should expect it to be
associated with every system, no matter how simple. “If there is experience
associated with thermostats, there is probably experience everywhere: wherever
there is a causal interaction, there is information, and wherever there is
154
information, there is experience.” Effectively, Chalmers advanced a version of
“panpsychism,” or the idea that consciousness is everywhere, and everything in
the universe is conscious.
VI. Metaphors in Action
“We do not think metaphors are very important, but a good metaphor is
155
something even the police should watch.”
So, we have seen how philosophers use metaphors to explore intuitions about
consciousness. But why these metaphors? And why metaphors at all? The rhetoric
of consciousness is ineluctably metaphorical. We can no more escape metaphors
on consciousness than we can escape metaphors on illness. As Susan Sontag
observed, “[I]t is hardly possible to take up one’s residence in the kingdom of the
ill unprejudiced by the lurid metaphors with which it has been landscaped. It is
toward an elucidation of those metaphors, and a liberation from them, that I
156
dedicate this inquiry.” So, too, with consciousness, itself already a metaphor.
But from whence do these metaphors come, and how shall we endeavor to liberate
ourselves from them, or at least peer through them, and cast our gaze upon some
fragment of that which they obscure?
A. Compulsive Anthropomorphism
A dog
that dies
and knows
that it dies
like a dog
and who can say
that it knows
that it dies
like a dog
153
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is a man.

157

Common sense and experience confirm that many non-human animals are
conscious and have subjective experiences. Indeed, it is at least possible that all
living things have some form of subjective experience and are conscious of the
world in some way, even if we cannot possibly comprehend their subjective
experience or consciousness. Not only mammals, but also reptiles and fish can be
trained to solve problems. Insects engage in complicated social behaviors. The
lowly flatworm makes choices. And even plants respond to external stimuli.
Perhaps consciousness requires some or all of the biological structures found
in brains. Or perhaps a rudimentary form of consciousness—preconsciousness?—is a consequence of the transition from mineral to animal.
Perhaps even viruses are at the cusp of pre-consciousness, “organisms at the edge
of life,” which possess genes, evolve, and reproduce, but lack a cellular
158
structure. Of course, if it is impossible to imagine what it is like to be a bat, it is
even more impossible to imagine what it is like to be a plant or a virus. But our
imaginations are not the measure of the world.
Nevertheless, we constantly and unselfconsciously imagine what it is like to
be a non-human animal. We just always imagine that the experience of being a
non-human animal is exactly the same as the experience of being a human. Our
anthropomorphism is compulsive, the very lens through which we view the world.
As we create God in our own image, and place ourselves in the center of the
phenomenology of the universe, so too do we create imaginary animals in our own
image, strange people clothed in fur, feather, and scale, performing peculiar
translations of human rituals. But even as our “compulsive anthropomorphism”
presumes to dignify animals by enabling us to imagine them as “almost human,”
it precludes us from imagining their actual experiences or even understanding
159
their actual efforts to communicate. Lions can talk, but we cannot—we will
not—understand them.
B. Digital Anthropomorphism
“So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he
160
him.”
Our compulsive anthropomorphism is hardly limited to animals. We
anthropomorphize everything, including the machines we make in our own image.
Children attribute personalities to their dolls, and adults attribute personalities to
their vehicles. Unsurprisingly, we are inclined to imagine the computer, a machine
designed to reproduce the form of human thought, as a potential candidate for
personhood. Indeed, we are inclined to imagine that because we created
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computers in our own image, as “thinking machines” capable of feats of logical
reasoning we can dream but cannot accomplish, they replicate how we think.
The speculative literature on strong artificial intelligence—of course, there is
no other kind—is replete with apocalyptic warnings of super-intelligent
161
computers that will swiftly render us obsolete. Our pharaohs of science and
technology imagine themselves brought low by their own creations and tremble.
“[A]nd children shall rise up against their parents, and shall cause them to be put
162
to death.”
But there is no particular reason to believe these fears are anything but
Oedipal fantasies. A computer is a Turing machine, and computers asymptotically
approach universal Turing machines, but brains are not necessarily Turing
machines, and human brains are not necessarily universal Turing machines.
Indeed, there is every reason to assume they are not. While we have learned many
things about brains, we do not actually know how brains work. But we do know
that brains do not appear to work like computers, as much as we like to use
computers as analogies for brains, and vice versa.
A brain is a collection of neurons, axons, synapses, and perhaps other as yet
unidentified or misunderstood structures. Some brains are larger and more
complicated than others. A human brain has about 86 billion neurons and 150
163
trillion synapses, a fruit fly brain has about 250,000 neurons and 10 million
synapses, and a Caenorhabditis elegans roundworm brain has 302 neurons and
164
about 7,500 synapses. While scientists have mapped every neuron in the C.
Elegans brain, one of the simplest nervous systems of any animal, they do not know
how it works. And they don’t have the first clue how the human brain works, or
how brains cause consciousness. It remains the domain of philosophical
speculation, not science.
By contrast, the central processing unit (“CPU”) or “brain” of a digital
computer is a collection of circuits that manipulate and store data in some
medium. The earliest computers had a relatively small number of circuits, but a
modern computer may have billions or trillions of circuits. As the structure of
computers became increasingly complicated, it became increasingly difficult for
humans to design every circuit in a computer, and engineers had to use computers
in order to design new computers. But in principle, humans can understand the
purpose and function of every element of a computer. We know how computers
work.
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Computers are designed to reproduce human reasoning, or how we think
165
about thinking. They are not and cannot be designed to reproduce how we
actually think, because we don’t know how we think. “Language may well be the
thing that makes possible the all-important leap from merely having intentions and
166
beliefs to having intentions and beliefs about intentions and beliefs.” We know
167
that thinking machines are possible, because brains are thinking machines. But
we do not know what kinds of machines can be thinking machines, because we
don’t know how thinking works.
The computational theory of mind assumes that consciousness, however
defined, can be realized in any physical form, including a digital computer. Of
course, it is conceivable that computers can replicate brains. But it is equally
conceivable that they cannot. At the very least, we know that while computers
reproduce a useful facsimile of human reasoning, they do not—and are not
intended to—reproduce human thinking. Indeed, one of the reasons that
computers are so useful is that the way they function enables them to do things
that human brains cannot do well, if at all. Perhaps the flip-side of this remarkable
functionality is that computers cannot do things that humans do well, like
“thinking,” however defined.
VII. Computer Intelligence as Tertium Quid
“As if beyond will or fate he and his beasts and his trappings moved both in
168
card and in substance under consignment to some third and other destiny.”
When we speak of “artificial intelligence,” we almost always mean
“computer intelligence.” Or rather, we mean the realization of consciousness or
its functional equivalent on a computer. Both apostles and skeptics of artificial
intelligence assume that proof of concept depends on whether a computer can
replicate a brain. After all, if a computer can replicate the functionality of even the
simplest brains (say, the 302 neurons of C. Elegans) then it is only a matter of scale
for it to represent the functionality of any brain.
But what if a computer cannot replicate the functionality of a brain? Recall,
we do not actually know how brains work. It is at least conceivable that one or
more physical elements critical to the functionality of a brain cannot be replicated
in a computer. Perhaps a computer cannot actually replicate the functionality of a
165
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neuron or synapse or some other element of a brain, for some reason we have not
yet identified and do not yet understand.
Would that necessarily mean a computer cannot be conscious? It depends on
our definition of “consciousness.” Certainly, it presumably would mean that
computers could not be conscious in the way that humans are conscious. But then,
it is already the case that nothing but a human can be conscious in the way that a
human can be conscious, just as nothing but a bat can be conscious in the way that
a bat is conscious, and nothing but a roundworm can be conscious in the way that
a roundworm is conscious, if it is conscious at all.
The question is whether it would be possible for a computer to be conscious
in any way, not just in the way that an animal with a brain is conscious. After all,
the overwhelming majority of living things lack brains. Plants lack brains, but react
to external stimuli. Single-celled animals lack brains, but appear to engage in
intentional behavior. Not even all multicellular animals have “brains” sponges
and Trichoplax adhaerens have no brain or nervous system at all, and have neither
neurons nor synapses. Cnidarians do not have brains or nervous systems, but do
have neurons that form a “nerve net.” And ctenophores do not have brains or
nervous systems, but do have nerve cells that evolved separately from all other
animals and have a different biochemistry.
But perhaps a computer could become conscious in a way that we cannot
currently understand. Ctenophores prove that a nervous system, and maybe even
a brain, could develop in more than one way. In some sense, they are our closest
approximation of an alien species, as their nervous system is fundamentally
different than the nervous system of any other animal. Presumably, a ctenophore’s
subjective experience, such as it is, is also fundamentally different from the
subjective experience of any bilaterian animal.
If more than one biological structure can support a nervous system, perhaps
a non-biological structure can also support a “nervous system,” a “brain,” or a
form of “consciousness.” But is there any reason to assume that we would
recognize it as such? It would be a fundamentally “alien” form of consciousness,
farther removed from our own than a roundworm, a ctenophore, a sponge, a
single-celled organism, or even a virus. It would be a “conscious thermostat,” no
matter how complex, a form of “life” so far removed from our own that surely we
would struggle to even recognize it as such.
And if such a form of consciousness is possible, how would we know if and
when it came into existence? Perhaps it already exists, as ignorant of us as we are
ignorant of it, existing as it were in parallel planes of consciousness, experiencing
mutually inconceivable worlds and thinking mutually incomprehensible thoughts.
Would it not be the ultimate irony if we were to unwittingly become the God we
imagined and create “Machine,” fashioned in our own image, but utterly alien to
ourselves, dreaming of a world we cannot imagine or ever inhabit?
Conclusion
I began this article by posing the question, “Can robots have rights?” I
conclude it by observing that the question is either trivial or impossible to even
ask, depending on the nature of the rights at issue and what theory of mind turns
43
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out to be true. Surely, a robot can have the rights of a thing or a legal entity.
Whether a robot should have those rights depends only on whether it would be
socially beneficial to recognize them.
Whether a robot can have the rights of an animal or person is another matter
entirely. If a dualist or reductionist theory of mind is true, then it is trivially true
that a robot can have the rights of an animal if it satisfies the criteria for
consciousness, and can have the rights of a person if it satisfies the criteria for
patiency, or moral agency. Under a dualist or reductionist theory of mind, a robot
with consciousness or patiency is just an animal or person realized in a different
form. Whether such a robot should have the rights of an animal or person depends
only on the extent to which we believe such rights should be contingent on a
biological or human form.
But if an agnostic theory of mind is true, or rather, if we simply don’t know
what causes consciousness and patiency, then it is impossible for us even to ask
whether a robot can have the rights of an animal or person. Can a “robot,”
however defined, possess the features that make an animal conscious or a human
a moral agent? Are those features “multiply realizable,” or can they be realized
only in certain physical forms? Are there alternative forms of consciousness and
patiency that we cannot understand or even perceive? These are questions we can
only pretend to pose, because we cannot know whether they are even meaningful.
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